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1972]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Whatever the relative merits of CPLR 5519(a)(1),
tion in Byrne is clearly correct.

56

its applica-

ARTICLE 71- RECOvERY OF CHATTEL

CPLR 7102: Replevin statute upheld against constitutional attack.
The New York replevin law, article 71 of the CPLR, amended in
response to Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.,157 has recently been
the subject of careful judicial scrutiny. Thus far, the statute has withstood the constitutional challenges which have been levied against it,
including the procedural due process argument made in General
Electric Credit Corp. v. Fred Pistone, Jr., Inc.6 8 The plaintiff therein
was the vendor's assignee of a conditional sales agreement. Title to
the goods, heavy duty equipment, was to remain in the plaintiff until
full payment was made. When the defendant fell behind in his payments, the plaintiff notified him of his default and ordered him to
return the equipment. Upon the defendant's failure to comply, the
creditor obtained an order of seizure under GPLR 7102. When confronted with this order by the sheriff, the debtor refused to surrender
the goods or to state their location.
In the ensuing contempt proceeding, the defendant, relying on
Laprease, contended that the order of seizure should be vacated because the statute was unconstitutional as a denial of procedural due
process. Rejecting this argument, the court declared that by amending
CPLR article 71 the Legislature had remedied its constitutional deficiencies. Under the deficient statute, a creditor could obtain a "prejudgment seizure without even an ex parte order of a judge or
court.... "159 The creditor would deliver to the sheriff an affidavit, a
requisition, and an undertaking, and the sheriff could then seize the
160
property.
The new CPLR 7102 eradicate[d] the "requisition" procedure, substituting in its place an "order of seizure". This interposes a neu102 App. Div. 367, 92 N.Y.S. 656 (2d Dep't), affd, 181 N.Y. 558, 74 N.E. 1120 (1905). The

state's timely assertion of this defect permitted the court to avoid this issue. 67 Misc. 2d
at 1085, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
Ir6 The characterization of CPLR 5519 as "most unfortunate" (7 WK&M
5519.03)
has been approved by the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Union Free School
Dist. No. 7 v. Alien, 30 App. Div. 2d 629, 290 N.Y.S.2d 669, 671 (3d Dep't 1968).
157 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
158 68 Misc. 2d 475, 326 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1971).

U91d. at 479, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 902, citing Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315
F. Supp. 716, 725 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
160 Former CPIk 7102(a). For a further discussion of the former replevin practice, see
H. WCcrrLL, Nmv YoRK PRACrcE UNDER THE CPLR 221 (3d ed. 1970); Comment, Laprease
and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 886, 888 (1971).
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tral judge between the plaintiff and defendant, and eliminates the
ancient right which the plaintiff had to direct the sheriff to seize a
chattel from the defendant. 61
The court also rejected the defendant's reliance on Laprease on
the ground that specialized property was involved there. The heavy
duty equipment, which was the basis of the contract, was not considered "necessary for day to day living, the taking of which will impose tremendous hardship on the defendant ....-162 The court found
that there was probable cause for the order of seizure and ordered the
defendant's president to appear for an examination as to the location
of the goods.
The amended statute will probably continue to withstand constitutional challenges, despite its faults. It is, for example, overbroad
on its face since there are no suggested guidelines regarding issuance
of orders of seizure. The only consideration which the statute mentions
is that the order should not violate the debtor's right to due process.
The Legislature has permitted the courts to decide, on a case-by-case
basis, (1) what types of property are specialized and (2) when a proper
situation for issuing an order of seizure exists. Dean McLaughlin eloquently summarized this problem by stating that
[t]he cardinal flaw of the new legislation is its Olympian generality,
for it says little other than that a judge may sign an order permitting the seizure of a chattel whenever it would be constitutional to
do so. 1' s
CPLR 7102: Equipment utilized in business deemed "specialized property."
As a consequence of the tremendous increase in consumer credit,
the remedies of replevin and attachment have been the subject of frequent judicial concern. The decisional vanguard of this movement is
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'6 Therein, the United States
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute' 65 which
161 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 7102, supp. commentary at 114 (1971). For a further discussion of the New York replevin statute, see The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
355, 379 (1971).
162 68 Misc. 2d at 479, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 902. But see Cedar Rapids Engineering Co. v.
Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1971), where it was
held that the seizure of tools and equipment used by the debtor to earn money was the
specialized type of property contemplated by Laprease and its progenitor, Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
163 7B McKINNEY' CPLR 7102, supp. commentary at 114 (1971).
164 395 US. 337 (1969).
165 WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1971). The sections overturned were §§ 267.04(1),
267.07(1), and 267.18(2)(a).

